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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEE ~I. HOUSLEY awl 
REESE C. HOUSLEY, 
Plaintiffs-APPELLAS'I'S, 
vs. 
THE ANACONDA CO.MPANY, a 
corporation, and DENN IS P. COX, 
Defendants, 
and 
THE TRA YELERS INSURANCE 
COlVIPANY, a corporation, 
Garnishee, 
RESPONDENTS. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 
10612 
This is an action for personal injuries and auto-
mobile damages arising out of a two-vehicle collision 
wherein plaintiffs have jointly sued The Anaconda 
Company and Dennis P. Cox, an employee of Ana-
l 
conda, who was driving a company vehicle at the time 
it struck the vehicle of plaintiffs; and to proceed against 
Cox, who left the State of Utah shortly after the acci-
dent, by garnishment proceedings against an insurance 
policy with The Travelers Insurance Company as the 
liability insurer of both Anaconda and Cox. 
DISPOSITION IN LU\VER COURT 
Four different judges of the Third District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County have made and entered 
various Orders in this matter involving-
(a) A ruling that defendant Cox, who left the 
State of Utah shortly after the accident, had 
not made a general appearance in certain pro-
ceedings relating to plaintiffs' Motion to 
Amend their Complaint; 
(b) The quashing of service of summons in an 
in rem proceeding brought by serving de-
fendant Cox in the State of Maryland, and 
the joining of The Travelers Insurance Com-
pany, as garnishee therein; 
( c) The granting of summary judgment in favor 
of defendant Anaconda Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the applicable Orders 
entered in this action establishing, m the alternative 
2 
as to Cox, either that defendant Cox made a general 
appearance in this matter or that the liability policy 
of insurance issued by The Travelers Insurance Com-
pany insuring both The Anaconda Company and Den-
nis P. Cox can be reached as a chose in action so that 
the lower court can proceed with the trial of this case 
in an in rem proceeding notwithstanding the absence 
of Cox from the State of Utah. As to The Anaconda 
Company, plaintiffs seek a reversal and setting aside 
of the Order granting summary judgment in favor of 
that defendant, and that the matter be sent back to the 
lower court for a trial on the merits of the action as 
to The Anaconda Company. 
STATE1"1ENT OF FACTS 
On January 5, 1959, in Salt Lake City, defendant 
Cox, while driving a motor vehicle owned by The Ana-
conda Company, and with its express permission (R. 
133) , drove into the rear of an automobile being driven 
by plaintiff Shirlee .M. Housley, and owned by plaintiff 
Reese C. Housley (R. 1). 
Plaintiff Shirlee M. Housley suffered severe back 
and neck injuries. Ruptured discs of the lower back 
have required fusion of that area of the spine and a 
further fusion is contemplated in the cervical spine. A 
female operation to prevent future childbirth has been 
performed as necessary treatment to prevent further 
aggravation of her spinal injuries (R. 18). 
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Her expenditures to date for hospitalization and 
medical expenses, therapeutic devices, drugs and medi-
cines, and nursing care, are in excess of $6,000.00. She 
is faced with partial permanent disability and continuing 
pain and suffering. 
'Vithin a few weeks after the accident defendant 
Cox departed the State of Utah and went to Brazil. 
Subsequently, he returned to the States, and now re-
sides in Mary land. 
'Vithin eight months after the collision (R. 3) 
plaintiffs caused a Complaint to be filed, and service 
of summons was made upon The Anaconda Company. 
However, inasmuch as defendant Cox had left the State 
of Utah approximately six weeks after the accident 
(Exh. 2-P-#24), personal service could not be made 
upon Cox. On November 6, 1963, pursuant to a motion 
made by plaintiffs to file an Amended Complaint set-
ting forth allegations justifying a proceeding against 
defendant Cox in an in rem count (R. 16-19), counsel 
for Cox appeared at the hearing (R. 165-168) and 
informed the court that he was appearing as Cox's 
attorney" ... for the purpose of this amendment ... ", 
and further informed the court that he wished to argue 
that plaintiffs " ... cannot state a cause of action 
against Mr. Cox." Thereupon, after several hearings 
and the submission of briefs, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson 
ruled on May 19, 1964 that in rem jurisdiction could 
be had in Utah to try the matter against Cox by reach-
ing the liability insurance policy insuring Cox, and that 
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the appearance in the matter by Cox, through his 
attorney, was not a general appearance " ... since the 
aforesaid ruling of the court that in rem jurisdiction 
can be had herein is considered by the Court to be a 
special appearance." (R. 61). 
N otwithstandnig the Order of Judge Jeppson, 
when personal service was actually made upon Cox in 
the State of _Maryland reciting the in rem nature of 
the proceeding and other incidents of the relief sought, 
counsel for Cox again appeared, and after one un-
successful attempt before Judge Aldon J. Anderson 
(R. 62-63), finally induced the latter, upon a re-hear-
ing, to issue an Order quashing summons (R. 82) on 
July 7, 1964. The last Order was apparently based 
upon what counsel for Cox asserted to be constitutional 
objections under Section 7 of Article I of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution in that Cox was being de-
prived " . . . of his property without due process of 
law " 
On December 13, 1965, a pre-trial hearing was 
had before Judge Stewart M. Hanson and a pre-trial 
Order was prepared setting the matter for trial as to 
defendant Anaconda Company (R. 131-133). There-
after, and prior to trial date, defendant Anaconda 
Company, appearing through the same counsel who 
represented Cox, moved for Summary Judgment, sup-
ported by the Affidavit ( R. 134) of defendant Cox, 
wherein the issue was raised as to whether Cox was 
5 
within the scope of employment of Anaconda Company 
at the time of the accident. The affidavit of Cox recite<l 
that at the time of the accident " ... I was on my way 
home to have lunch with my wife." He further stated 
that "I cannot now recall whether I was going to pick 
up equipment after lunch on the day of the accident." 
Based upon the record before the Court at the time, 
together with the Afficfavit of Cox, Judge Merrill C. 
Faux entered an Order granting Summary Judgment 
in favor of Anaconda Company on March 16, 1966 
(R. 160). 
ARGUMENT 
This Appeal is taken and based upon the following 
points: 
I. IN REM JURISDICTION CAN BE HAD 
IN UTAH BY GARNISHMENT OF AN IN-
SURANCE POLICY AS A CHOSE IN ACTION 
SO AS TO GIVE UTAH COURTS JURISDIC-
TION TO PROCEED IN A PERSONAL IN-
JURY ACTION WHERE THE DEFENDANT 
HAS DEPARTED THE STATE OF UTAH 
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE. 
II. THE DEFENDANT'S APPEARANCE 
BEFORE JUDGE JEPPSON ON NOV. 6, 1963, 
WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION. 
III. THE ORDER GRANTING SU.MMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
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ANACONDA COl\IPANY IS UNSUPPORT-
ABLE UNDER THE FACTS AND THE REC-
ORD BEI<'ORE THE COURT. 
POINT I 
IN REM_ JURISDICTION CAN BE HAD 
IN UTAH BY GARNISHl\:IENT OF AN IN-
SURANCE POLICY AS A CHOSE IN ACTIOX 
SO AS TO GIVE UTAH COURTS JURISDIC-
TION TO PROCEED IN A PERSONAL IN-
JURY ACTION 'VHERE THE DEFENDANT 
IIAS DEPARTED THE STATE OF UTAH 
AFTER THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE. 
The facts of this case concerning jurisdiction create 
a somewhat unusual situation-but one which undoubt-
edly will occur more and more frequently with the 
mobile population which faces the American future. 
At the time of the accident the defendant, Dennis P. 
Cox, was apparently a resident of the State of Utah. 
Shortly after the accident Mr. Cox left Utah for Brazil, 
making it difficult to obtain in personam jurisdiction. 
This has created an anomalous and ironical situation 
since Utah's long arm statute, U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 41-12-
8, has been held in 'l'eague v. District Court, 4 Utah 2d 
147, 289 P.2d 331, and Brandon v. Teague, 5 Utah 
2d 214, 299 P. 2d 1113 (1956), to apply only to those 
persons who were nonresidents at the time of the injury. 
Thus, by leaving the State of Utah a resident can avoid 
jurisdiction over his person, whereas a nonresident is 
subject to substituted service. 
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Basically, what the plaintiff seeks to do in this 
case is to obtain in rem jurisdiction by garnishment 
of a chose in action belonging to the defendant. This 
action does not contemplate acquiring in personam 
jurisdiction over the defendant, nor does it contemplate 
any form of direct action against the liability insurer. 
The plaintiff merely intends to impose a lien upon a 
chose in action in the hands of a third party and to use 
such lien as a basis for in rem jurisdiction. Any recovery 
by the plaintiff will be limited to the value of the 
attached chose in action. 
This procedure is authorized by U.C.A. 1953, 
Rule 64 D. Rule 64 D specifically provides for gar-
nishment prior to judgment. Further, an attachment 
or garnishment with constructive service gives juris-
diction to proceed in the main action against property 
of the defendant. Bristol v. Brent, 35 Utah 213, 99 P. 
1000. 
The United States Supreme Court has sanctioned 
this procedure whereby constructive service can be used 
to obtain in rem jurisdiction, allowing the plaintiff to 
proceed in the main action against property of the 
defendant in the hands of a third party. Chicago R.R. 
Co. v. Sturm, 174 U. S. 710, 19 S. Ct. 797 (1899); 
Harri,s v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 S. Ct. 625 (1905). 
This procedure is not prohibited by Pennoyer v. Neff, 
95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877), since that case 
merely prohibits the use of constructive service in ob-
taining in personam jurisdiction. 
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The conflict on this point initially arose when the 
plaintiff filed a "Notice and Motion for .Filing Amend-
ed Complaint" ( R. 15-23). By this motion the plaintiff 
sought to amend the complaint to contain an in rem 
count against a chose in action belonging to the defend-
ant, Cox, and being held by The Travelers Insurance 
Company. The defendant, Cox, made an appearance 
to object to this amendment (R. 165-169). Never-
theless, the plaintiffs' motion was granted by J udgc 
Joseph G. Jeppson in the following language ( R. 60-
61) : 
"NO,V, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that: 
I. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has a chose in 
action under a liability insurance policy which 
can be reached by plaintiffs to acquire in rem 
jurisdiction in these proceedings, and plaintiffs' 
motion to amend their complaint accordingly is 
hereby granted and garnishment may issue as 
requested." 
This final Order dated l\'Iay 19, 1964, followed 
Judge J eppson's .Minute Entry dated December 5, 
1963, which gave initial approval to the amendment 
and the in rem action (R. 121). In the interim, how-
ever, process was constructively served upon the defend-
ant, Cox, in the State of Maryland (R. 27). Thus, in 
rem jurisdiction had been established prior to Judge 
J eppson's final Order (R. 121). 
Being unable to obtain a reversal from Judge 
Jeppson, defendant Cox, through his attorney, pre-
9 
sented the matter to a different judge. In an Order, 
dated May 25, 1964, (R. 62-63), Judge Anderson 
denied defendant's motion to dismiss the Amended 
Complaint and to quash the service of summons, saying 
that the 
" . . . Order of Judge Jeppson had disposed 
of the legal and factual issues material to the 
1\-lotion before the Court, and to grant the :Mo-
tion to Dismiss to Quash Summons at this time 
would require a reversal of the prior Order in 
the matter involving the same matters of law 
and fact; ... " 
Nevertheless, the persistent defendant obtained an 
"Order Granting Motion to Quash Summons" (R. 
82) by a second appeal to Judge Anderson on July 7, 
1964. By Judge Anderson's own language (R. 62-63) 
he thereby reversed the prior Order issued at the hand 
of Judge Jeppson. 
In resolving this question, which has been framed 
by the respective judges and also in the interpretation 
of cited cases, it is crucial that the statutory language 
be closely consulted. This was made clear in 134 A.L.R. 
853, 854 ( 1941), where the annotation reads: 
"The remedy of garnishment or attachment 
is in derogation of the common law and exists 
only by virtue of statute. 4 Am. Jur. 555, At-
tachment and Garnishment, Sec. 8. 
"There appears to be a garnishment act or 
statute, or an act or statute relating to a similar 
process, in practically every jurisdiction, though 
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in so.me states the statute does not specifically 
provide that to make an obligation not due or 
not payable, garnishable, its payment must not 
depend upon a contingency. 
"However, it is laid down as a general rule by 
text writers that a debt which is contingent, and 
may never become due and payable, is not sub-
ject to garnishment, is stated in Hanover F. Ins. 
Co. v. Connor (1886) 20 Ill. App. 297. 
"Sometimes and in some jurisdictions the 
statute has apparently permitted the garnish-
ment of contingent obligations, and in that case, 
of course, the question under annotation does 
not arise." 
This same state of the law was expressed m 47 
)farq. L. Rev. 221, 222 (1963). 
"In the absence of statutes to the contrary, a 
debt which is uncertain and contingent, in the 
sense that it may never become due and payable, 
is not subject to garnishment. Only a few states 
have by statute provided for the garnishment 
of contingent interests." (Emphasis added). 
It is submitted that Utah is one of those states 
allowing garnishment of contingent interests. Cases not 
so allowing garnishment of contingent interests can 
be explained on the basis of the applicable state statute. 
134 A.L.R. 853 ( 1941), discusses Banionis v. Lake, 
289 .l\Iass. 146, 193 N. E. 731 (1935), where an obli-
gation under a settlement agreement to pay upon release 
was held contingent and not garnishable " (a) Under 
a statute making a debt subject to the trustee process 
11 
if its payment does not depend upon any contingency 
" 
In Gray v. Houck, 68 S. W. 2d 117, 167 Tenn. 
233 (1934), the Tennessee Supreme Court held against 
the plaintiff on facts similar to those in the case at bar. 
However, that decision was necessitated by the Code 
of Tennessee, 1932: 
23-601 ( 9396) 
Grounds for Attachment - Any person having 
a debt or demand due at the commencement of 
an action, or a plaintiff after action for any cause 
has been brought, and either before or after 
judgment, may sue out of an attachment at law 
or in equity, against the property of a debtor 
or defendant, in the following cases: 
( 1) Where the debtor or defendant resides 
out of the state 
23-603 ( 9400) 
Debts not due - An attachment may in like 
manner, be sued out upon debts or demands not 
due, in any cases mentioned in 23-601, except 
the first; that is, when the debtor resides out of 
the state. (Italics added). 
23-701 ( 9428) 
A.ssets subject to garnishment. - Where prop-
erty, choses in action, or effects of the debtor are 
in the hands of third persons, or third persons 
are indebted to such debtor, the attachment may 
be by garnishment. 
An analysis of the three quoted statutory provi-
sions shows that garnishment proceedings are tied to 
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attachment proceedings, and that a limitation pro-
hibited attachment or garnishment upon a debts or de-
mands not due ... to hen the debtor or defendant resides 
out of the state." 
60 A.L.R. 884, 885 ( 1929), discusses the garnish-
ability of notes or accounts in the possession of a third 
party for collection. On this issue the courts split, but 
in referring to a decision holding that a note was not 
garnishable from a custodian the annotator said: 
"The reason for the decision was that a mere 
custodian of choses in action who has received 
no money upon them is not liable to an attach-
ment in execution, as he is in no sense a debtor 
to the defendant in the execution." 
It is obvious that the applicable statute in that case 
did not allow attachment or garnishment of a chose 
m action. 
However, the applicable Utah statute, U.C.A. 
1953, Rule 64 D, does provide for the garnishment of 
a chose in action. 
(a) When plaintiff entitled to writ; affidavit-
The plaintiff, at any time after the filing of 
the complaint, may have a writ of garnishment 
issue, and attach the credits, effects, debts, choses 
in action, money, and other personal property of 
the defendant in the possession or in the control 
of any third person, as garnishee, whether the 
same are dne rd the time of the service of the 
writ or are to become due thereafter, . . . " 
( I tali cs added) . 
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The exact scope of this statute has not been deline-
ated by this Court, but a comparison of the statutes of 
sister states will soon show that the Utah statute is 
indeed broad. The Utah statute expressly allows gar-
nishment of a chose in action to become due after service 
of the writ. 
That an insurance policy is a species of property 
in the nature of a chose in action, susceptible of owner-
ship like any other chose in action, there can be no 
doubt. 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Sec. 186; Black, Law 
Dictionary (3rd ed. 1933); Thompson Heating Corp. 
v. Hardware Indemnity Ins. Co. of Minn., 72 Ohio 
App. 55, 50 N.E. 2d 671, 673; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 
441, 447, 12 L. Ed. 1147. The defendant has even so 
much as admitted this in his pleadings (R. 64, 71), 
where he erroneously cited Pennoyer v. Neff for the 
proposition "that a denial of his motion to dismiss and 
quash summons will deprive him of his property without 
due process of law." It was upon that motion that 
Judge Anderson acted in the quashing of summons 
(R. 82). 
The case of Acheson-Harder Co. v. Western 
Wholesale Notions Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 P. 1032, 60 
A.L.R. 881 ( 1928), is appropriate to point out the 
significance of the allowance of garnishment of a chose 
in action to become due after service of the writ. In that 
case this Court held that accounts placed in the hands 
of the garnishee for collection, but not collected, could 
not be reached by the service of a writ of garnishment 
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upon the person having such accounts in his hands 
for collecton. This Court held that the liability of the 
garnishee to account to the defendant for property 
or indebtedness must be absolute, in order that such 
property or indebtedness be garnishable. The then 
existing statute, Laws of Utah 1925, C. 106, required 
that the garnishee have 
"property, money, goods, chattels, credits or 
effects in his, or its hands or under his or its con-
trol belonging to the defendant or defendants, 
or any or either of them, or that such person 
or persons, firm or corporation is indebted to 
the defendant; that the defendant is indebted 
to him or it on such contract, judgment or decree, 
sued upon, ... " (Emphasis added). 
The present statute has obviously liberalized gar-
nishment proceedings by adding chose in action, by 
including language to the effect that the asset need 
not be due, and by deleting the reference to such con-
tract, judgment or decree sued upon. By definition 
alone, a chose in action does not mean absolute indebt-
edness. Sheldon v. Sill, supra; United States v. J. T. 
Hubbell, 323 F. 2d 197 (5th Cir. 1963). 
Furthermore, the Acheson Case can be clistin-
guished on the basis that the obligation was contingent 
qua contingent since the garnishee himself had an act 
to perform to determine his liability. In other words 
the O'arnishee could have effectively blocked the gar-
b • 
nishment by not making the collection. In the case at 
bar all facts which would make the garnishee liable 
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have occurred; the garnishee himself cannot, by action 
or inaction, prevent his liability to the defendant. 
At this point it should be made clear that the plain-
tiff is not engaged in a direct action against The 
Travelers Insurance Company. Such a procedure has 
not been permitted by Utah law. Rule 64 D merely 
permits the imposition of a garnishment lien as a basis 
for in rem jurisdiction whereby the plaintiff can proceed 
in the main action against property of the defendant. 
This proceeding, in contrast to a direct actiou 
(personal), is not prohibited by the insurance contract 
between defendant and garnishee. The contract does 
contain a "no action" clause in the following words: 
CONDITIONS 
13. Action Against Company-
N o action shall lie against the company unless, 
as a condition precedent thereto, the insured 
shall have fully complied with all the terms of 
this policy, nor until the amount of the insured's 
obligation to pay shall have been finally deter-
mined either by judgment against the insured 
after actual trial or by written agreement of the 
insured, the claimant and the company. (Em-
phasis added) . 
This action is not" against the company" but rather 
against Cox, by reaching a liability insurance contract 
between him and the insurance company. This distinc-
tion was made clear by a prominent Utah defense 
attorney, Ray R. Christensen, Direct Rights and Reme-
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dies Against Liability Insurers, 28 Utah llar Bull. 155 
( 1958), where he said: 
"Under the provisions of Rule 64 D, the writ 
of garnishment apparentcy will lie before judg-
ment is obtained against the insured. However, 
it would serve a useful purpose only in rare cases 
such as suggested under paragraph A. above." 
The distinction between a tort claim and a contract 
claim is necessitated under Utah law. Plaintiffs are 
not attaching an unliquidated tort claim, which is the 
nature of the chose in action which they have; rather, 
they are proceeding against a contractural right which 
defendant Cox has against The Travelers Insurance 
Company to have the latter pay damages on his behalf 
arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. 
That an unliquidated tort claim could not be gar-
nished under Rule 64 D was held by this Court in 
Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376, 380 
(1957). In that case the plaintiff obtained a $20,000.00 
personal judgment against the defendant. The insur-
ance company, garnishee, paid to its maximum liability 
of $10,000.00. The plaintiff claimed that the garnishee 
was negligent in not making a settlement, and that 
therefore the garnishee was liable to the defendant in 
tort. The plaintiff attempted to label this tort claim as 
a chose in action under Rule 64 D, and garnished same. 
This court held that an unliquidated tort claim 
was not a chose in action within Rule 64 D. In this 
respect this Court specifically referred to the claim of 
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defendant against garnishee and not the claim of plain-
tiff against defendant. This Court's determination was 
necessitated by the language of Rule 64 D (m) where 
it indicates that the garnishee may set off any debt 
owed him against defendant, but is liable for the balance 
"not including 1tnliquidated damages for wrongs and 
injuries." 
By way of dicta this Court went one step further 
and assumed that an unliquidated tort claim was a chose 
in action. 
"Let it be assumed that the facts alleged in 
plaintiffs' second reply to defendant's answer 
show the existence of a chose in action in favor 
of Kirkendall and against garnishee which would 
support a judgment against garnishee which we 
do not here decide, nevertheless we are of the 
opinion that that chose in action must be pro-
cessed by defendants' instituting an action in 
court against the garnishee where all rights and 
issues may be determined in the garnishment 
proceedings.'' 
The Court would here appear to be reading into 
the statute a requirement that the chose in action or 
claim of defendant against garnishee be absolute, liqui-
dated and not contingent. It is respectfully submitted 
that no language of Rule 64 D so infers and that a chose 
in action, by definition, is unliquidated and uncertain. 
In Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U. S. 411, 447, 12 L. Ed. 1147, 
"A chose in action is a thing in action, a right 
of action, a thing recoverable in action, a debt, 
a demand, a promissory note, a right to recover 
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dama&'es. A chos~ in action was originally a right 
of action not assignable at law. It was a cause 
of suit for a debt due or a wrong done." 
Surely a demand implies no certainty, nor does 
a right of action. In First Nat. Bank v. FI olland, 39 
S. E. 126, 129, 99 Va. 495, 55 L.R.A. 155, 86 Am. St. 
Rep. 898, Kent's definition of a chose in action is 
quoted. 
"A 'chose in action' is defined by Kent (2 
Kent's Comm. pt. 5, p. 351) as a personal right 
not reduced to possession, but recoverable bv a 
suit at law. Money due on bond, note or o{her 
contract, damages due for the breach of contract 
for the detention of chattels, or for torts, as 
included under this general head or title of things 
in action. A chose in action is a mere right of 
action due, a personal chattel not in actual pos-
. " session. 
Again, it is submitted that Utah is one of the states 
ref erred to in Annot., 134 A.L.R. 853 ( 1941), and 
47 Marq. L. Rev. 221 ( 1963), which allows garnish-
ment of contingent obligations. Nevertheless, it is also 
submitted that the chose in action which the plaintiffs 
seek to attach is not contingent. 
In J(nudson v. Anderson, 199 .Minn. 479, 272 N. 
,V, 379 (1937), a judgment was obtained against the 
defendant in a suit arising out of an automobile accident. 
The insurance company denied liability upon the basis 
that ownership of the offending car was in another. 
The injured plaintiff then garnished the insurance 
company. The Minnesota statute, Mason's Minn. Stat. 
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1927, Sec. 9361, being much more strict than Utah's 
Rule 64 D, provided: 
"No person or corporation shall be adjudged 
a garnishee in any of the following cases: 
( l) By reason of any money or other thing 
due to the defendant, unless at the time of the 
service of the sumons the same is due absolutely, 
and without depending on any contingency." 
In answering the question as to whether the estab-
lishment of the fact of ownership created a contingency 
within the meaning of Sec. 9361, the Court said: 
"It is not contemplated that the garnishee 
shall interest himself for the protection of his 
creditor, who is the defendant in the original 
action; nor should the statute be so construed 
as to enable the garnishee to assist his creditor. 
* * * 
"The contingency must affect the actual lia-
bility of the garnishee and be such as may pre-
vent defendant from having any claim whatever 
against the garnishee or right to call him to an 
accounting, and not merely the title to the prop-
erty in possession of the garnishee, or his liability, 
the force and effect of which may be in dispute 
between defendant and garnishee. 
"Litigation is often, if not always, uncertain 
as to ultimate result. But that uncertainty after 
all is dependent upon establishment of the facts. 
When these are established, the uncertainty no 
longer exists. We think the uncertainty or 'con-
tingency' ref erred to in the statute is such as is 
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inherent in the obligation itself, not the un-
certainty of what litigation may establish as 
facts." 
In the case at bar all facts which would establish 
liability of the garnishee to the defendant have occurred; 
hence, there is no contingency in the legal sense. The 
only uncertainty is the establishment of these facts in 
a court of law; the plaintiffs merely seek that oppor-
tunity. 
The nature of the insurance contract and the Utah 
Safety Responsibility Act both contribute toward mak-
ing the liability of The Travelers Insurance Company 
to defendant, Cox, more certain. In this respect the 
insurance contract in force between defendant and 
garnishee is one of liability insurance, rather than of 
indemnity insurance. Thus, payment need not be made 
by the defendant before the insurance company's liabil-
ity becomes certain. The only uncertainty remaining 
is the uncertainty which the plaintiffs seek to resolve 
m this case. 
The Utah Safety Responsibility Act also con-
tributes toward making the liability of The Travelers 
Insurance Company to defendant, Cox, more certain. 
U.C.A. 1953, Sec. 41-12-21 (f) (1) and (2) provide: 
" ( f) Every motor vehicle liability policy shall 
be subject to the following provisions which need 
not be contained therein: 
( 1) The liability of the insurance carrier with 
respect to the insurance required by this act 
shall become absolute whenever injury or 
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damage covered by said motor vehicle liabil-
ity policy occurs; said policy may not be 
canceled or annulled as to such liability by 
any agreement between the insurance car-
rier and insured after the occurrence of the 
injury or damage; no statement made by 
the insured or on his behalf and no violation 
of said policy shall defeat or void said policy. 
(2) The satisfaction by the insured of a judg-
ment for such injury or damage shall not 
be a condition precedent to the right or duty 
of the insurance carrier to make payment 
on account of such injury or damages; ... " 
As indicated by the defendant (R. 96), "The lan-
guage "the liability of the insurance carrier with respect 
to the insurance required by this act shall become abso-
lue" means that the Insurance Company cannot cancel 
the policy or attempt to escape its obligation under the 
policy." Thus the insurance company can bring up no 
side defenses to disclaim liability to the defendant. 
Upon the occurrence of the accident all facts needed 
to establish liability have occurred; no contingency 
exists. 
Additional authority for this point is United States 
v. J. T. Hubbell, 323 F. 2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1963). 
In that case a United States tax lien was held to attach 
to an unliquidated tort claim pursuant to 26 U.S.C.A., 
Sec. 3670, which imposed "A lien in favor of the United 
States upon all property and rights to property, whether 
real or personal ... " Suit had not been commenced 
upon the tort claim at the time the lien attached. The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said: 
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"Lewis' claim against Housing Authority was 
not contingent merely because it would take a 
lawsuit to reduce it to judgment or to collect it. 
It was, perhaps uncertain, but not subject to 
any infirmity which would prevent the attach-
ment of a lien. The real issue in this case, the 
unprecedented one, is whether the lien attaches 
to an unliquidated claim sounding in tort.Neither 
party cites us to a case directly in point, and 
we have found none. We see no reason, how-
ever, why a tort claim is not 'property' or 'rights 
to property', just as, e.g., any unliquidated con-
tract claim is so considered." 
If a federal tax lien can attach to an unliquidated 
tort claim pursuant to a statute in terms of "property 
and rights to property" then, a fortiori, a garnishment 
lien can attach to an unliquidated contract claim pur-
suant to a statute in terms of "personal property" and 
"choses in action". 
The case of Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. 2d 541, 543 
(8th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 276 U.S. 628, 72 L. Ed. 
739, 48 S. Ct. 321 ( 1928), is conclusive authority in 
favor of the plaintiffs on the iss'ue before this Court. 
In that case, the garnishee, Fidelity and Casualty Com-
pany, insured defendant, Singer, against interior office 
robbery. Singer submitted a claim on February 4, 1924. 
The Fidelity and Casualty Company disputed Singer's 
claim, and while the matter was in dispute, on March 
10, 1924, creditors of the defendant filed an attach-
rnent suit in New York and a warrant of attachment 
was issued thereon. On March 11, 1924, service of 
garnishment was had on the F'idelity and Casualty 
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Company of New York. On April l, 1924, construc-
tive service was had by Singer in St. Louis. On April 
7, 1924, Singer began action against Fidelity & Casu-
alty Company; this suit was subsequently removed to 
a federal district court. The last judgment obtained 
by any creditor was August 23, 1924, while the consent 
judgment of Singer against Fidelity and Casualty 
Company was not rendered until December 17, 1924. 
The :Fidelity and Casualty Company filed a bill 
of interpleader in which the trustee in bankruptcy 
attacked the attachment liens on the ground that the 
New York court did not have jurisdiction of the res, 
because the insurance claim was an unliquidated cause 
of action upon a contract, and, being such, was not 
garnishable under the New York statute; that it was 
not garnishable because the claim was unliquidated, 
and that there was a genuine dispute as to the liability 
of the Fidelity & Casualty Company to Singer. 
In holding the garnishment of the unliquidate 
contract clai mto be valid the Court said: 
"The fact that the attachment is issued before 
the debt is conclusively established on which it 
is founded, and it may subsequently be shown 
by the defendant in the attachment that there 
was no such debt, is not a sufficient reason for 
holding that the attaching creditor cannot show 
that the property attached is in fact the debtor's. 
* * * 
"The contingency which will prevent garnish-
ment is not presented by the mere fact of denial 
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by the garnishee of the obligation. The uncer-
tainty contemplated by the law is one that con-
ditions the obligation, rendering it uncertain in 
the sense that it may never become due or owing, 
the determination of that being contingent upon 
the happening of some future event. 
"The court may take evidence and determine 
what the truth is as to whether or not the event 
determining the liability has or has not happened, 
and the mere denial of the indebtedness by the 
garnishee does not prevent garnishment." 
The only distinction between Ackerman v. Tobin 
and the case at bar is that in the former there was un-
certainty as to the liability of defendant to plaintiff 
and also of the liability of garnishee to defendant; 
whereas, in the latter the only uncertainty concerns 
the liability of defendant to plaintiff. It is this un-
certainty which the plaintiffs seek to resolve by estab-
lishing in rem jurisdiction allowing them to proceed 
in the main action against property of the defendant 
within the jurisdiction of the court. 
Since Judge Jeppson ruled that in rem jurisdic-
tion could be had by reaching a chose in action under 
the liability insurance policy and "that garnishment 
may issue as requested", it is submitted that the Order 
quashing service of summons was improperly entered 
and should be set aside so that proceedings can coutinue 
m rem. 
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POINT TWO 
THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAHANCE 
BEFORE JUDGE JEPPSON ON NOV. 6, 1963, 
\V AIVED HIS OBJECTION TO PERSON AL 
JURISDICTION. 
On October 22, 1963, the plaintiffs filed a "Notice 
and Motion for filing Amended Complaint" (R. 15-
23) . This amendment sought to add an in rem count 
to the complaint so as to garnish an insurance policy 
as a chose in action. Prior to this time, and prior to 
the hearing, no personal jurisdiction had been acquired 
over defendant, Dennis P. Cox, since no summons 
could be served under the applicable sfatutes. This 
motion was heard on November 6, 1963 ( R. 165-169). 
At the hearing, and before any jurisdiction had 
been acquired, the defendant, represented by his attor-
ney, made an appearance. That the attorney, Mr. 
Nebeker, represented the defendant, Cox, is subject 
to no doubt, as evidenced by the Reporter's Transcript 
(R. 165-169). Judge Jeppson, realizing that Cox could 
well be making a general appearance, closely questioned 
~Ir. Nebeker (R. 166) : 
THE COURT: Do you not represent Mr. 
Cox? 
lVIR. NEBEKER: \:Ve are appearing espe-
cially for that purpose, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You do not represent .Mr. 
Cox? 
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. l\;IR. N_EBEKER: For the purpose of re-
sisting this amendment, Yes. No jurisdiction 
over .Mr. Cox, that is the problem. 
THE COURT: Are you Mr. Cox's attorney! 
You did not so state. 
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, I would represent 
here we are representing him for the purpose 
of this amendment. 
The sanie transcript also sheds light upon the rea-
son for the appearance by defendant, Cox (R. 165): 
THE COURT: This motion is to amend as 
to Mr. Cox, is it not? 
MR. FULLER: Essentially as to Mr. Cox, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection 
to that? 
MR. NEBEKER: We would object to that 
-appearing especially for that purpose, yes. 
Here Mr. Nebeker expressly said that he was 
appearing especially to object to the motion to amend 
as to Mr. Cox. The defendant further stipulates (R. 
100) : "It is undisputed that the only motion before 
Judge Jeppson was plaintiffs'· motion to amend their 
complaint." 
In objecting to the motion to amend the complaint, 
the defendant argued that the plaintiffs could not state 
a cause of action against ~Ir. Cox (R. 166): 
THE COURT: Do you want to argue he 
cannot state a cause of action against Mr. Cox? 
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, Your Honor. 
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On December 5, 1963, Judge Jeppson made a 
minute entry (R. 121), which was finalized by Order 
of ~fay 19, 1964 (R. 60-61). As applicable to this issue, 
that Order read (R. 61): 
2. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has made a spe-
cial appearance herein challenging personal 
jurisdiction over his person, and that such ap-
pearance did not constitute a general appearance 
since the aforesaid ruling of the Court that in 
rem jurisdiction can be had therein is considered 
by the Court to be a special appearance. 
From the foregoing Order it can be seen that Judge 
J eppson's ruling as to the nature of the appearance 
was tied to the question of in rem jurisdiction. If the 
objection went to jurisdiction over the matter in an 
in rem action, then the appearance would be considered 
as special under the majority rule. 129 A.L.R. 1240. 
This is apparently the way Judge Jeppson so con-
sidered the case. However, if it is considered that in 
rem jurisdiction cannot be obtained or that the matter 
before the Court, being merely a motion for filing an 
amended complaint in a personal action, had no indicia 
of an in rem action, then the appearance would be one 
which would waive any objection to personal juris-
diction. 
The plaintiffs here contend that the defendant 
made an appearance, without objecting to jurisdiction 
over his person, at a hearing wherein the complaint 
was personal and the hearing had no indicia of an in 
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rem action, and by so doing waived his objection to 
personal jurisdiction. 
The determination of this issue involves an inter-
pretation of U.C.A. 1953, Rule 12. This rule is sub-
stantially identical to the federal rule. The federal rule 
was interpreted in Orange Theatre Corporation v. Ray-
herstz Amusement Corporation, 139 F. 2d 871, 874 
(3rd Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U. S. 7 40, 88 L. Ed. 
1.573, 64 S. Ct. 1057, in the following words: 
"It necessarily follows that Rule 12 has abol-
ished for the federal courts the age-old distinc-
tion between general and special appearances. 
A defendant need no longer appear specially to 
attack the court's jurisdiction over him. He is 
no longer required at the door of the federal 
courthouse to intone that ancient abracadabra 
of the law, de bene esse, in order by its magic 
power to enable himself to remain outside even 
while he steps within. He may now enter openly 
in full confidence that he will not thereby be 
giving up any keys to the courthouse door which 
he possessed before he came in. This, of course, 
is not to say that such keys must not be used 
promptly. If the defense of lack of jurisdiction 
of the person is not raised by motion before 
answer or in the answer itself it is by the express 
terms of pargaraph (h) of Civil Procedure 
Rule 12 to be treated as waived, not because of 
the defendant's voluntary appearance but be-
cause of his failure to assert the defense within 
the time prescribed by the rules." 
The language in the Orange Theatre Case, which 
indicates that the distinction between general and spe-
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cial appearances has been completely abolished, cannot 
be taken literally. It is true, however, that the emphasis 
has been changed. 'Vhere formerly a defendant coulcl 
not object to jurisdiction over his person, and being 
overruled, plead to the merits without waiving his 
objection to personal jurisdiction, a defendant can 
now join his defense to personal jurisdiction with other 
defenses without affecting a waiver. IIence, the dis-
tinction between a general appearance, one where the 
defendant appears without having first objected to 
jurisdiction over his person, and a special appearance, 
one where the defendant objects to, inter alia, juris-
diction over his person, is still a viable one. United 
States v. Onan, 190 F. 2d 1 (8th Cir. 1951) cert. 
denied, 72 S. Ct. 112, 342 U. S. 869; Savas v. Maria 
Trading Corp., 285 1'-.. 2d 336 (4th Cir. 1960); Graff 
v. Nieberg, 233 F. 2d 860 (7th Cir. 1956); Barreiro 
v. McGrath, 108 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Calif. 1952), 
rnodified, Barreiro v. Brownell, 215 F. 2d 585 (9th 
C~r.), cert. denied, 75 S. Ct. 207, 348 U. S. 887; United 
States v. Balanovski, 230 F. 2d 298 (2nd Cir. 1956); 
Hasse v. Arnerican Photograph Corp., 299 F. 2d 666 
(10th Cir. 1962). 
Because of this change in emphasis many courts 
speak in terms of waiver by nonjoinder instead of 
waiver by joinder or by general appearance. This 
position is stated very clearly in the following quotation 
from 16 Cal. State Bar Journal 152, which is incor-
porated under the Notes of Advisory Committee on 
Rules to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure: 
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"The new federal Rules do not in terms abolish 
the "special appearance", but have this effect. 
. . . : If a pa~ty so desires, he can make a pre-
hmmary motion solely on the grounds of juris-
diction of the subject matter or person, venue, 
or process Rule 12 (g) ; but he need not do so, 
and waives nothing by ma.king such objections 
to the answer. . . . On the other hand, if the 
objecting party does not raise all of these dila-
tory defenses (except, of course, jurisdiction of 
the subject matter) in any motion he may make, 
or in the answer if he has made no motion, he 
does waive Rule 12 (g) and (h). So while the 
form of the old "special appearance" is pre-
served in the preliminary motion under Rule 
12 ( g) , in substance the preliminary motion is 
a matter of convenience, not of necessity, and the 
formula has been reversed. Where formerly 
joinder might mean waiver non-joinder is likely 
to create a waiver." (Emphasis added). 
Similar explanations can be found in Allen B. 
DuMont Laboratories, Inc. v. Marcolus Manufactur-
ing Co., Inc., 30 N. J. 290, 152 A. 2d 841, 847 (1959), 
and in 15 U. l\!Iiami L. Rev. 269, 272. 
The applicable statute, U.C.A. 1953, Subdiv. 12 
(g), reads: 
"(g) Consolidation of Defenses. A party who 
makes a motion under this rule may join with it 
the other motions herein provided for and then 
available to him. If a party makes a motion under 
this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available to him which this 
rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall 
not thereafter make a motion based on any of 
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the defenses or objections so omitted, except as 
provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
Subdivision ( h) makes no exception for objections 
to jurisdiction over the person. 
ln applying this statute to the ease at bar it should 
be kept in mind that the defendant, Cox, appeared 
from nowhere to object to a motion for filing an amend-
ed complaint. No prosess had been served upon him. 
In making his objection or counter-motion he did not 
"include therein all defenses and objections then avail-
able to him" i.e., the objection to jurisdiction over his 
person. 
Under the new procedural rules the timeliness of 
any motion is crucial. The jurisdictional objection must 
be made in the first instance or on the first appearance 
to prevent a waiver by nonjoinder. This point has 
been made clear in a multitude of cases. The Aquia, 
72 F. Supp. 201 (E.D.S.C. 1947); McLaughlin v. 
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Ry. Co., 
23 Wis. 2d 592, 127 N. W. 2d 813 ( 1964) ; In re In-
dustrial Associates, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 866 (E. D. Pa. 
1957) ; Yentzer v. Taylor Wine Company, Inc., 409 
Pa. 338, 186 A. 2d 396, 398 ( 1962). 
In the latter case the court held that the defendant 
had made a "general" appearance even though he had 
previously filed a motion to quash the service of process 
and to dismiss the action, but had not appealed the 
adverse ruling or subsequently joined the jurisdictional 
objection. The Court said: 
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. ".When t~e ~efendant filed the original pre-
hmmary ob.Jections to this case, which objected 
only to the substance and form of the complaint, 
a.nd no:ie of ~hich raised a jurisdictional ques-
tion, this constituted a general appearance in the 
action.'' 
The question next arising is what constitutes an 
appearance sufficient to affect a waiver. The cases 
and authorities are in clear agreement that an uncom-
pelled appearance whereby the defendant resists the 
cause of action without objecting to personal juris-
diction is sufficient to affect a waiver. Hadden v. Rum-
sey Products, 96 F. Supp. 988 ('V. D. N. Y. 1951); 
Anderson v. Taylorcraft, Inc., 197 F'. Supp. 872 (W.D. 
Pa. 1961); 5 Am. Jur. 2d; Appearance, Sec. 16; U.S. 
v. Hoerner, 157 F. Supp. 563 (D. Mont. 1957). 
In the latter case the court said on page 567: 
"In fact, any act which resognizes the case as 
in court constitutes a general appearance, and 
even in the face of a declared contrary intention, 
a general appearance may arise by implication 
from the defendant seeking, taking, or agreeing 
to some step or proceeding in the cause bene-
ficial to himself or detrimental to the plaintiff, 
other than one contesting only the jurisdiction 
of the court, . . . " · 
The last quotation also refers to the insignificance 
of the label which the defendant attaches to his appear-
ance. Thus, it is of no legal significance that the de-
fendant labels his appearance as being "special" or 
"especial". It is the substance of the appearance which 
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prevails over the form. U. S. v. Hoerner, supra; Had-
den v. Rumsey Products_. supra. 
It must be made clear that the waiver contem-
plated by Rule 12 is sufficient to confer personal juris-
diction where none otherwise existed. Personal juris-
diction being merely a privilege, it can be waived. Thus, 
personal jurisdiction can be obtained by waiver albeit 
no summons was ever issued. Drinkwater v. Drink-
water, Ill F. Supp. 559 (D. Colo. 1953); Emerson v. 
National C,ylinder Gas Co., 131 F. Supp. 299 (D. 
Mass. 1955). 
The unfairness of the defendant's position is pointed 
out in Savas v. Maria Trading Corp., 285 F. 2d 336 
(4th Cir. 1960), where the defendant sought the court's 
help on his own behalf and yet resisted the court's 
jurisdiction on behalf of his adversary. This position 
where the defendant seeks to have his cake and eat it 
too is clearly untenable. In calling for mutuality the 
court, on page 341, said: 
"We think that under these circumstances it 
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court 
and cannot escape liability through its subse-
quent jurisdictional exceptions to the cross-libel 
of Associated Bulk and to the amended libel of 
Savas. Even if it was not validly served with 
process it should not be heard to say that the 
court had the power to decide in its favor but no 
power to render a decree against it. It subjected 
itself to the general rule that a litigant who seeks 
action by the court without objecting to the 
jurisdiction thereby makes a general appearance 
and subjects itself to the court's power." 
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POINT THREE 
THE ORDER GRANTING SU.l.VIMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 
ANACONDA COMPANY IS UNSUPPORT-
ABLE UNDER THE FACTS AND THE REC-
ORD BEFORE THE COURT. 
Pursuant to the pre-trial Order plaintiffs pro-
ceeded to prepare their case for trial against The 
Anaconda Company, and the case was set for trial. 
Thereupon defendant Anaconda Company made a 
motion for summary judgment and claimed that de-
fendant Cox was not acting within the scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident so as to impose 
liability upon The Anaconda Company. In support 
of its position it secured an Affidavit from Cox in 
Maryland (R. 134), and submitted it to the local court. 
The pertinent statements in the Affidavit are as follows: 
"At the time of the accident I was on my way 
home to have lunch with mv wife .... On a 
number of occasions I used ·the car to pick up 
laboratory equipment on my way back to my 
office. . . . I cannot now recall whether I was 
going to pick up equipment after lunch on the 
day of the accident ... " 
It will be the purpose of plaintiffs to point out 
to this Court that the Affidavit, considered with the 
entire record in this matter, is insufficient to support 
a summary judgment in favor of defendant Anaconda. 
l\:Iuch of the information referred to is contained in the 
Exhibit packet attached to the record, which contains 
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"Statement Regarding Use of Company Cars", Inter-
rogatories to The Anaconda Company, Answers to 
Interrogatories, and the published deposition of Roland 
l\:Iulchay, assistant chief geologist for The Anaconda 
Company. 
On the day of the accident defendant Cox was 
driving a vehicle owned by defendant Anaconda Com-
pany with its express permission ( R. 18, 25) . The 
vehicle being driven by Cox was not an ordinary auto-
mobile: rather, it was a 1958 Gl\:IC panel truck, similar 
to the large vehicles used by survey crews on road 
projects and similar activities. At the precise time of 
the accident, according to Mr. Cox's Affidavit, he was 
going home to lunch. 
\Vithout admitting that Cox was on his way home 
to lunch, it would seem that the Affidavit, in the absence 
of a controverting affidavit or other substantial evi-
dence, would support the defendant to that extent. 
However, an examination of the statement in the Affi-
davit serves no further purpose other than to point out 
that Cox on a number of occasions was called upon 
to pick up laboratory equipment on his way back to 
the office, that he could not recall what he was going 
to do with the vehicle on the day of the accident after 
getting his lunch other than it was his intent to return 
to the office where he was working. With the meager 
help furnished by the Affidavit submitted by Cox, we 
must now look to the pertinent portions of the record, 
namely: Defendant's Answer to the Amended Com-
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plaint, Defendant's Answer to the Interrogatories 
which have been ndmitted in evidence, the Deposition 
of Roland Mulchay, chief geologist for defendant 
Anaconda Company in charge of geological work in 
the west, and other available pleadings and exhibits. 
As is so often the situation in cases involving 
agency, evidence relating to agency and the scope of 
employment is solely within the control and knowledge 
of the defendant company and outside the knowledge 
of plaintiff injured by the negligence of an employee-
driver. Plaintiffs submit that in this case a presumption 
of agency has been created sufficient to present a ques-
tion of fact for determination by a jury and that the 
Affidavit of Cox falls far short of rebutting this pre-
sumption. Plaintiffs will now establish that defendant 
Anaconda Company benefitted by giving Cox express 
permission to use the vehicle at the time the accident 
occurred. 
At the time of the accident, Cox was a salaried 
employee working for Anaconda Company as a geolo 
gist ( M ulchay Deposition 3-25) . He worked directly 
under :Malcolm Kildale, who was in charge of the Salt 
Lake office ( Mulchay Deposition 4-11). Cox spent 
time both in the field and in the off ice, and was driving 
a "field" vehicle furnished to geologists for work on 
field examinations (Mulchay Deposition 8-11). The 
O'eoloaists did not follow a regular work schedule, and 
b b 
might be called on a field trip at any unscheduled time 
( Mulchay Deposition 12-28), including a call for an 
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immediate field trip at noon or afternoon (l\Iulchay 
Deposition 15-25). Therefore, it was for the conveni-
ence of the compa11y to permit the geologists to take 
these vehicles to and from their homes so that the geolo-
gists would have access to a field vehicle upon instant 
notice to move to a different project (-Mulchay Depo-
sition 13-26). Anaconda would pay all the gas and oil 
and expenses for the operation of the field car at all 
times ( l\Iulchay Deposition 14-4) irrespective of where 
the men might take the car ( .Mulchay Deposition U-
13 )-and Anaconda obviously secured all income tax 
benefits from expensing such operations against its 
earnings. Since the company had numerous interest-; 
in the Salt Lake area and in the Park City district, 
Bingham Canyon, and other places around the general 
perimeter of Salt Lake, it was frequently desirable for 
geologists to make short field trips upon instant notice 
to see particular developments ( Mulchay Deposition 
16-3). It is particularly significant to observe that 
Anaconda Company did not permit its employees to 
use company vehicles for their personal use (Answer 
to Interrogatory No. 27) , nor did they permit em-
ployees, and specifically Dennis P. Cox, to have the 
use of company vehicles for their own personal use 
during lunch time breaks within the regular working 
day (Answer to Interrogatory No. 31) , unless it would 
facilitate company work ( l\Iulchay Deposition 12-283: 
"#31. As of January 5, 1959, was it the policy 
of the company to permit Dennis Cox, or other 
employees haying similar duties, to have the use 
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of company vehicles for their own personal use 
during lunch tim breaks within the regular work-
ing day? 
Answer: No." 
From Mr .. Mulchay's Deposition: 
Pages 10 and 11: 
Q. All right. Assuming that Mr. Cox was ac-
tually working in Salt Lake City in the office 
at the time of the collision, would Anaconda, 
as to Cox and men similarly situated, permit 
them to use vehicles to go to and from their 
work each day where they were stationed 
here in Salt Lake City. If you do not under-
stand, I will back up and take it slower. 
A. The use of vehicles in that regard is strictly 
in connection with field work, and they were 
not supposed to use it on personal business. 
* * * 
Page 12: 
A. Well, I believe that my former statement 
tells exactly what the policy is. Possibly an 
example would serve to illustrate it better. 
One of the fellows, John Tombs, a geologist 
in the Salt Lake office, left early this morn-
ing to go to Bingham to map corps. To facili-
tate this work, the car was at his house, and 
he left early, directly from his house, rather 
than coming to the off ice and then going to 
the field. 
* * * 
Pages 12 and 13: 
A. Because the nature of the work is not subject 
to an accurate schedule, he would be able to 
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do this to facilitate his work in case that he 
must make a field trip at some particular 
time, which could not be scheduled. 
Page 13: 
Q. Under those circumstances, would a man 
such as Cox, even though he was working 
here in the office in the Kearns Building, be 
permitted to use this car, then, in going to 
and from his home subject perhaps to call 
that he may go somewhere else the next day? 
'V ould that be a good illustration or not? 
A. Well, I believe it would, yes. But not neces-
sarily for personal convenience. 
* * * 
Page 13: 
Pagel4: 
Q. Did you feel in any way it served the con-
venience of the company to have men like 
this one you mentioned this morning, or any-
one else to have access to these cars so that 
if they would be subject to a call to move 
to a different project for something of that 
sort? 
A. That arrangement is made. 
Q. And while men would have access to these 
cars at times when they might take them, say, 
home at night and then go from there when-
ever directed, would Anaconda pay the gas 
and oil and expenses on the operation of the 
car? 
A. Yes. 
* * * 
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Q. Were these particular cars, from your knowl-
edge, and I am speaking of 1959, right up 
until the present, are there ever occasions 
when Anaconda furnishes cars to say-geolo-
gists and have them, the geologists, pay for 
the gas and oil and any upkeep for opera-
tional costs ? 
A. No. 
* * * 
Page 17: 
Q. I see. Do you know whether l\Ir. Cox was a 
salaried employee? 
A. I believe Mr. Cox was a salaried employee. 
* * * 
As previously pointed out in the answer of de-
fendant Anaconda Company to plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint, it was admitted that Cox had express per-
mission of Anaconda Company to use the field car 
at the time the collision occurred. Consequently, con-
sidering Mulchay's statements that the vehicles were 
used solely for company purposes and not for personal 
use, the express perrnission certainly would not have 
been given for the use of the vehicle unless in some 
manner there was a benefit to Anaconda Company. 
The benefit might have been that Cox was to pick up 
supplies as was suggested in his Affidavit, or he might 
have been called upon immediate notice to proceed 
to some location outside the city for company work, 
or he might have been called upon for any number of 
duties involving his movement with the vehicle which 
he had in his possession. In any event, the device of a 
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summary judgment in this situation is extremely harsh 
and improper. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held it 
fundamental that where pleadings filed and represen-
tations made to the trial court at a hearing for summary 
judgment dispute a moving parties' claim sufficiently 
to raise an issue of fact or an inference from those facts 
such a motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
(Calder v. Siddoway, 330 P.2d 494, 8 Utah 2d 174). 
The trial courts should be reluctant to employ such a 
drastic remedy as a summary judgment and deprive 
litigants of an opportunity to fully present their con-
tentions upon trial. (T¥ elchman v. Wood, 337 P. 2d 
410, 9 Utah 2d 25; Richards v. Anderson, 337 P. 2d 
59, 9 Utah 2d 17) . All doubts should be resolved in 
favor of permitting trial and summary judgment should 
be granted with reluctance. (I-Ienry v. Washiki, Inc., 
355 P. 2d 973, ll Utah 2d 138). Normally plain-
tiff must prove agency by inference or implication 
rather than by direct evidence since the facts of agency 
are entirely at the command of the defendant company. 
Plaintiff submits that such inference has been created 
by the pleadings and the deposition of Mr. Mulchay 
and that this issue should be resolved by a jury. 
In the case of TVright v. Intennountain Car Com-
pany, 53 Utah 176, 177 P. 237, involving a somewhat 
similar case but substantially different on its facts 
because on the day involved there was no business trans-
action of any kind being conducted by the employee 
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for his employer and there being no other purpose for 
using the car involved except for the social purpose 
of dating a young lady, the Utah Supreme Court ob-
served that a moving plaintiff should not be held to a 
standard of direct proof of agency: 
"Where it appears, as in this case, that the 
instrumentality which causes an accident and 
injury was, at the time of such accident in the 
custody and control of the servant or agent of 
the owner of such instrumentality, and the plain-
tiff is unable to show by direct evidence that 
the instrumentality was at the time being used 
by the agent or servant within the scope of his 
employment and in the master's business, Courts 
are usually q11,,ite liberal in permitting the plain-
tiff to prove facts and circumstances from which 
the master's liability may be inf erred." 
The court further held that where the evidence 
is inferential, conflicting or doubtful, it is clearly for 
the jury to pass on. 
"If the evidence in this case had been inferen-
tial or doubtful respecting the purpose for which 
the car was being used at the time of the accident, 
the plaintiff's circumstantial evidence would have 
been proper and would have presented a ques-
tionable effect for the jury." 
In the case of Larkins v. Utah Copper Company, 
127 P.2d 354, an employee of defendant company had 
the duty to inspect lumber purchased by the company. 
He was subject to a call at any time and could be 
sent any place the company wanted to send him. On 
the day in question the employee traveled to Bukoda, 
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'i\T ashington, completed his work, and was on his way 
returning to his own home when an accident occurred. 
The Court held that the company benefitted from hav-
ing the employee return home after having completed 
his inspection in order to be available for call to do 
other like work. The Court further held that while 
the general rule is that one is not within the course of 
his employment when going to or from work unless 
engaged in the furtherance of his master's business, 
the instant case is to be distinguished in that the use 
of the automobile was impliedly authorized, that such 
method of transportation was reasonably necessary for 
the efficient prosecution of the company's business, 
and that the employee was subject to call at any time. 
Disregarding the pleadings and deposition of 
~iulchay, Cox's affidavit is ambiguous and uncertain 
concerning his business activity in returning to the 
office. In 52 A.L.R. 2d 391, the writer of that anno-
tation speaks upon the subject as follows: 
"Where there is evidence that the driver is 
combining a business trip or business duties with 
a trip after a meal, it has been held that he might 
be found to have been acting in the scope of his 
employment." 
Thereafter, the annatator cites the case of Barz 
v. Fleischmann Y cast Company, 308 Mo. 288, 271 
S.,i\T. 361, holding that the question of scope of employ-
ment should have been suhmitted to the jury, and a 
directed verdict for the defendant was reversed where 
defendant's shipping clerk took one of its trucks in 
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order to go to his noon meal. Defendant's testimony 
showed that the driver acted without authority and was 
not authorized to drive the truck, but there was evidence 
for plaintiff that immediatley after the accident, when 
the driver offered to take plaintiff home, he had said 
that he had first some deliveries to make. The Court 
held this evidence was sufficient to submit to a jury 
and the directed verdict was reversed. 
Also, where there is evidence justifying the con-
clusion that the employer received some special business 
benefit from the employee's use of the automobile in 
going to and from his meals, it has been held that he 
might be found to be within the scope of his employment 
( 52 A.L.R. 2d 397). The fact that Cox was subject 
to call at any time in going to and from his meals indi-
cates a convenience to the company in permitting the 
use of the field car. 
In 8 Am. J ur 2d, Sec. 629, page 182, the anno-
tator enunciates the folowing rule: 
" * * * where an employee is involved in an 
accident while proceeding to get a meal in the 
course of a business errand undertaken in the 
course of his employment, it is generally held 
that he has not left the scope of his employment 
for the ,reason that this use of the vehicle is a 
normal incident of the business errand, or that 
the employer derives some special business bene-
fit from this use of his vehicle;" 
In summary, the uncontroverted facts reveal that 
defendant Anaconda Company was the owner of the 
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vehicle involved in the collision; that Cox was defendant 
Anaconda's employee on a salary and subject to calls 
at all hours; that the defendant company furnished 
to Cox a field vehicle and permitted him to take the 
field vehicle to his home for the convenience of the 
company in order to be available for instant calls to 
go to area projects; that it was the company policy 
not to give permission for use of vehicles for private 
use but only when accompanied by a business use or 
convenience of the company; that express permission 
was given for the particular trip during which the 
accident occurred. The Affidavit of Cox does not deny 
the possiblity of a call by the company directing him 
to another work project. Also, he could not recall 
whether he would pick up equipment after lunch on 
his way back to the office. The pleadings and ~Iulchay 
deposition, coupled with the admission by defendant 
Anaconda Company that Cox had permission to use 
the car at the time of the accident, create an inference 
of benefit to the company and control of the employee 
sufficient to submit this issue to a jury. In Fox v. 
Lavender, 56 P.2d, 1049, 109 A.L.R. 109, the Court 
held: 
"When there is a paucity of facts from which 
any inference as to agency or the lack of it can 
be had, solution may depend entirely upon pre-
sumptions. And these presumption may, in many 
cases, not only serve to relieve the plaintiff on 
the duty of presenting evidence tending to show 
agency, but may have the effect of substantive 
law." 
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In Higgans v. Deskins, 263 S.W. 108, 52 A.L.R. 
2d 346, the Court held that proof of ownership coupled 
with evidence of employment create a presumption 
of responsible agency which requires the defendant to 
take up the burden of evidence and rebut the presump-
tion. The Court stated: 
"This rule of practice rests on the view that 
the ownership of an automobile implies the right 
of possession and control, and the evidence essen-
tial to the determination of the question is pecu-
liarly within the owner's knowledge. He knows 
whether the machine is being operated by his 
employee or agent so as to render the owner 
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
while a person injured by the negligence of the 
driver ordinarily cannot know and may find it 
impossible to prove that he was acting for the 
owner within the range of the employee's duty 
or authority." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant Cox 
has made a personal appearance in this action submitting 
him to the Court's jurisdiction, and, in any event, 
that in rem jurisdiction as to his liability can be had 
through garnishment proceedings in accordance with 
the ruling of Judge Jeppson heretofore made in this 
matter and that the Order quashing summons should 
be set aside and nullified. Further, as to defendant 
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Anaconda Company, this matter should be returned 
to the Third District Court for a trial on the merits. 
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